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FROM GEORGE SMILEY TO QUANTUM OR ON FICTION, 









This paper aims to bring together the two realms of spy-story (fiction) and Security Studies 
(reality) along the time of the Cold War and after the implosion of the Soviet Union. It is conceived 
in terms of an intellectual exercise in which fictional narrative and academic research are put 
together in order to test their respective “representations” of reality. It debates the problem that is 
still into the protocol of work of the intelligence community – an old paradigm of “certification” and 
interpretation of reality is imposed, framing a dynamic and global world into the fragile limits of 
blind schemes, which unfortunately are reflected in the result of a bureaucratic mind.  
Keywords: international relations, securitization, security sectors, intelligence studies, 
intelligence community, security communities, security studies.  
 
 
My paper aims to bring together the two realms of spy-story (fiction) and 
Security Studies (reality) along the time of the Cold War and after the implosion 
of the Soviet Union.  
This intellectual exercise in which fictional narrative and academic 
research are put together in order to test their respective “representations” of 
reality, is not an eccentric divertissement but can be read as an approach which, 
in my opinion, has its root in the philosophy of science literature.  
If the western countries’ academic environment together with their 
respective intelligence communities were busy in producing the “reality”, and the 
“real” picture of our common enemy (Soviet Union), their scientific results were, 
unfortunately, very distant from the “real” object of their study and analysis. 
However, despite the fact that after the implosion of the Soviet Union the 
majors International Relations and Security theories where criticised and found 
inconsistent in their “scientific” production, still their approach play a major role 
in the production of the nowadays paradigm of reference in the western world.  
If the big dilemma is linked to the production of “ways of knowing” more 
familiar to the environment of the philosophy of science, I can say that the same 
problem is reflected into the work of the “rigid” scientific world which has been 
incapable to produce intuitions able to explain the “world out there”, while other 
“fiction” works have been able to observe and foresight other “liquid” realities.  
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The problem is that still into the protocol of work of the intelligence 
community an old paradigm of “certification” and interpretation of reality is 
imposed, framing a dynamic and global world into the fragile limits of blind 
schemes, which unfortunately are reflected in the result of a bureaucratic mind.  
  
 
1. George Smiley’s World and the Orthodox Security Studies Paradigm 
 
I want to take the fictional character of George Smiley1, produced by the 
imagination of the British writer John le Carre’, and demonstrate that despite 
the fact that he came from fictional literature, he embodied perfectly the 
“paradigm” in fashion among intelligence and academic members of what 
constituted “intelligence” during the Cold War period.  
If George Smiley’s world then can stereotype the Cold War intelligence 
community, on the same level the Security Studies theories, better grouped 
under the label of “Orthodox Security Studies” (OSS), because of their 
preference to see security issues through military lens, can represent here in my 
paper the scientific results of that academic environment which theorizing on 
security and insecurity problems produced a process of “certification”.  
Despite the fact that these two separate worlds, fiction and “academic 
scientific” reality, can be seen as rationally opposed, at the very end each one of 
them produced two identical hermeneutical circles in which the same narrative 
was fabricated with the aim to create a plot in which quite the same enemy, 
threats, and of course solution were presented in both environments. 
The link between George Smiley and the OSS community (and the OSS 
security certification) strongly supported not only by political elites but by various 
agencies, can be seen in the common assemblage of the stereotype of the enemy 
who leaving his human condition took the shape of the nuclear weapon. 
In his way, the British spy had to spy (and the academic environment had 
to research) on what the political elites were concerned, in what in their 
paradigm of interpretation was considered an enemy, and what constituted a 
security problem, then on the military aspects, not the human one, summarizing 
in a simple equation: a security problem was a military problem to be solved 
through military means. 
In this paradigm George Smiley was trained, domesticated, and convinced, 
according to a certificated protocol of interpretation, that what he had to search 
                                                          
1
  George Smiley is a fictional character created by John le Carré. Smiley is an intelligence 
officer working for MI6 (often referred to as “the Circus” in the novels and films), the British 
overseas intelligence agency. He is a central character in the novels Call for the Dead; A Murder 
of Quality; Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy; The Honourable Schoolboy; and Smiley's People, and a 
minor character in a number of others, including le Carré's breakthrough novel The Spy Who 
Came in From the Cold, The Looking Glass War and The Secret Pilgrim. 
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for was the “military” aspect of “security”, and unfortunately the same happened 
inside the academic milieu. 
I have to add that, writing myself from a Western country, all the above 
aspects found their territorial space into the geographical dimension of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, then the NATO-OSS and Smiley’s 
security-intelligence paradigm was not only the same but was even “imposed” 
on the territory of the enemy, like pretending that the enemy was going to play 
on the same chess game as us. 
However, as I said before, the enemy was dehumanized, he was not 
“human” (or at least he was human like us-NATO), then he became a “nuclear 
weapon” which like a pawn was moved and used according to the same 
emotions, motivations, way of thinking, and perceptions which referring to our 
certified paradigm were the only rule of the game. 
As a result there was the assemblage of a “scientific” paradigm which 
defined security solely in military terms, where the enemy had not a soul, not 
even an identity, and where the “nuclear weapon” ended to represent a totem around 
which a whole academic, political, and intelligence protocol was constructed. 
At this point I would like to introduce the reader to some concepts 
developed by Security Studies in order to demonstrate the evolution of some 
approaches and definitions in this dynamism which will contribute, I hope, to 
the abandon of an old paradigm (orthodox) to a new one (liquid) more close to 
the reality of nowadays. 
My approach is justified by the fact that the meaning of “security”, as I 
will demonstrate here, is more wide, comprehensive, and fluid, then the one 
“officially certified” by the OSS which is definitely solid and constructed around a 
military protocol of interpretation which produced a parallel intelligence 
community which is unmistakably unprepared to deal with “cellular system”2.  
 
 
2. Security Studies: From Orthodoxy to Liquidity 
 
I will start with linking the topic of security studies between two terms: 
orthodoxy and liquidity. 
                                                          
2
  According Arjun Appadurai: “’Vertebrate systems’ work off of traditional nationalist 
models – propagating symbols, such as flags, and originary stories of the nation-state affiliated 
with structures national identity. ‘Cellular systems’ (international) offer more leaky modes of 
exchanges and mobile borders. These include various cyber communities, including terrorist 
networks, as well as transnational corporations, producing the movement of people, money, and 
products outside official regulatory channels. Cellular systems take more abstract, at times 
predatory, forms, eroding more "unified" national structures through the accelerated and shape-
shifting forms of entities such as finance capital.” See A. Appadurai, Fear of Small Numbers: An 
Essay on the Geography of Anger, Durham, Duke University Press, 2006. 
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Both terms found an historical position in the period that stretches from 
1991 up to 2010 (date of the adoption of the NATO new Strategic Concept), 
and this is because the facts which have been registered in this lapse of time will 
represent the mirror in which “security” will be reflected. 
 
 
2.a. Orthodox Security: The Cold War Period  
 
The Cold War period ended with the implosion of the Soviet Union, and 
we are well aware that the Soviet Empire was not defeated by any army, any 
foreign conquest, not to mention any atomic bomb. 
“Security studies may be defined as the study of the threat, use, and 
control of military forces”3, and definitely the supremacies of strategic studies 
on security studies was very well reflected even inside the academic 
Department of Political Science and International Relations. 
Just to pronounce the word “security” and in our mind the uniformed 
image of a soldier used to appear, and the same, unfortunately, happen again 
today: security was, and is, synonymous with defence and defence with military 
forces and military attacks. 
Due to the above correlation, the construction of the enemy’s identity was 
a priority, and then shaped by the domestic politicians, the military intelligence, 
and the media, as a chorus of agencies. This was, as it is, a pedagogic, a 
learning process in which stereotyping the “enemy” enforce the construction of 
our own identity: considering the other our enemy, we were forced to define us 
as the opposite of the supposed enemy. In this orthodox, rigid opinion, of 
security (OSS), our identity was constructed on this side of the wall, while on 
the other side another opposed identity was constructed. 
I can even push this idea to look at the “Iron Curtain” as a real curtain 
that was dividing two parallel stages in which, in each one of them, two similar 
plays were performed: the “Great Theatre of the Cold War”, using a reference to 
the baroque Spanish play writer Pedro Calderon de la Barca’. 
“El Gran Teatro del Mundo”, in which until the curtain was down, we see 
a play within a play, and we know that the two theatres, in a way and in another 
were hermeneutical isolated. In it every author, every actor, every theory, and 
every ideology, being in a position not to be confronted or challenged by the 
opposite, were retaining a monopolistic position. 
Therefore they were two antagonistic ideological monopolies and 
“scientific” paradigms for the construction of meanings. 
                                                          
3
  S. Walt (1991), “The Renaissance of Security Studies”, International Studies Quarterly, 
35 (2), pp. 211-239.  
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Even the NATO countries intelligence services, which were operating 
inside the other theatre, were incapable in foretelling the implosion of the 
devil’s empire, or understand from the local social political context what was 
going on. Indeed, in military terminology, each one of the theatres was 
representing potential theatres for military operations. 
Using the orthodox approach in which security and the military go hand in 
hand, the two military organisations, that found a justification and a raison d’être 
on the above interpretation, were respectively NATO and the countries forming the 
Warsaw Pact. Each organisation drawn a geopolitical space of operation divided by 
a wall and an iron curtain. Indeed NATO article 5 (and 6) of the North Atlantic 
Organisation frames security and insecurity inside the idea of an armed attack 
against the territory and on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties4.  
We can recognise that the containment and the deterrence policies prevented 
the two sides to come to a direct armed confrontation with catastrophic results, but 
the point here is to analyse and ask: why, even after the end of the Cold War 
pantomime, the concept of “security” and the activity of the intelligence service 
continues to concentrate and to be linked together to a military approach?  
To understand it we have to come back to the etymological meaning of 
“security” (Latin “securus+tas”): freedom from care; carelessness. 
It is confronting the above incontestable meaning with the imposed 
“imaging” and paradigm of security (security = military forces), and the recent 
historical events, that the break represented by the emergence of Critical 
Security Studies (CSS) forms a productive moment in re-interpretation and 
reframing security providing the inspiration for a new paradigm and then not 
only protocol but theory.  
In their totality, the rich contributions brought by the auto defined schools 
of Copenhagen, Paris, Aberystwyth, and other CSS authors which do not want 
to see themselves entrapped inside a static dogma, is revolutionary in scientific 
terms. But why is their approach revolutionary? 
According to Mary Kaldor “Social science is about telling stories”5 and 
indeed, like Don Quijote and Sancho Panza, our condition is to be completely 
surrounded and immersed into stories. Stories which are told to us through the 
use of a language, images, media, etc., but the story can be a language in itself 
because “language itself conditions, limits, and predetermines what we see. Thus, 
all reality is constructed through language, so that nothing is simply ‘there’ in an 
unproblematic way – every-thing is a linguistic/textual construct. Language 
doesn’t record reality, it shapes and creates it, so that the whole of our universe is 
textual.”6 As John the Evangelist wrote, “In the beginning, was the word”.  
                                                          
4
  The North Atlantic Treaty is available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm. 
5
  M. Kaldor, Human Security, Cambridge, Polity, 2007. 
6
  P. Barry, Beginning Theory: an Introduction to Literary and Cultural Theory, Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 2002. 
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Critical Security Studies represent a moment of opening the frame in 
which the story of security has been told. Furthermore CSS has allowed 
glimpsing at security issues at more multidimensional levels, drawing on board 
other sciences that until that moment were not part of the official protocol and 
working instruments. 
Indeed Ken Booth writing on CSS talks about “emancipation”: “Emancipation 
is the theory and practice of inventing humanity, with a view to freeing people, as 
individuals and collectivities, from contingent and structural oppressions. It is a 
discourse of human self creation and the politics of trying to bring it about.”7  
The above process is supported by the works of Buzan, Waever, and de 
Wilde, who reformulated a new framework for security analysis. 
Buzan8 developed the sectorial analysis of security in which the military 
security is only one of five sectors, joined by the environmental, economic, 
societal and political security. Then in 1998 with the publication of “Security: A 
new framework for analysis”9, they developed an approach to the process of 
securitization in which security is treated as a speech-act, as a linguistic 
performance which re-constitutes the world it represents. 
Let’s have a look to the constant elements accumulated until here: 
security, military, stories, language, frame, emancipation, sectors, speech-act. 
The link between the essence of security (securitas), its representation-frame 
(military or the Buzan five sectors), emancipation-oppression, and speech-act is 
astonishing. But what have they in common? 
If according to the orthodox approach to security (OSS) the referent 
object of security is the state itself, in the field of CSS and human security, the 
referent object is the human being, or the human community, not the citizen of a 
particular state, or the state itself. 
It is for the above reason that I suggest an approach to security in which 
elements of psychology, sociology, NLP (Neuro-Linguistic Programming) 
together with the CSS visions can re-establish a return to the very meaning of 
security. Coming back to Don Quijote and Sancho Panza, we all know that both 
are literary characters, but using their images I would like to link them together 
to our capacity of memorizing. 
“The brain has two memory system, one for ordinary facts and one for 
emotionally charged ones”10, and indeed our brain is formed by two opposite 
hemisphere, the right and the left one. Both hemispheres perform distinctive 
actions, and for the effect they memorise facts and / or emotions, I would like to 
say that in our brain both Don Quijote (emotions) and Sancho Panza (facts) live. 
                                                          
7
  K. Booth (ed.), Critical Security Studies and World Politics, London, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2005. 
8
  B. Buzan, People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the 
Post-Cold War Era, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.  
9
  B. Buzan, O. Waewer and J. de. Wilde, Security: A new Framework for Analysis, 
Boulder CO, Lynne Rienner, 1998. 
10
  D. Goleman, Emotional Intelligence, London, Bloomsbury, 1996. 
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Security is invoked and affected by both reason and facts and emotion and 
intuition. We are at the same time Don Quijote and Sancho Panza, and the way 
external events are perceived and memorized, we build up our personal mind 
map of our perceptions, which create a state and drives our behaviour. 
According to Ernest Cassirer, 11  mankind, in order to mentally adjust 
himself to the immediate environment, and through his capacity to imagine, is 
capable of creating a new dimension of reality, defined as a symbolic system. 
“He lives rather in the midst of imaginary emotions, in hopes and fears, in 
illusions and disillusions, in his fantasies and dreams”.  
The orthodox approach to security calls in the image of military threats, 
the sound of bombs, the memories of atrocities, and the idea of chaos. Waltz in 
his Theory of International Politics 12  talks about “anarchy” in which it is 
understood as the lack of a superior authority in the international system (an 
authority with enforcing power). He suggests that anarchy itself is the location 
of fear. The structure of anarchy means states must compete for power in order 
to survive in this self-help system. According to him the security dilemma is an 
attribute of international anarchy.  
But Cynthia Weber focuses her research on fear and International 
Relations Theory and assert that “anarchy does not create the fear that Waltz 
theories in Theory of International Politics. Rather fear creates the effects that 
Waltz attributes to anarchy – prioritizing survival, self help over cooperation, 
and either conflict or competitive balancing. (…) The fear is the fear of fear 
itself. (…) Fear, then, is the final supplement of Waltz’s theory.”13 
Then we can add other elements which play a role in the construction of 
the idea of OSS: anarchy and fear. Definitely both terms provide to our brain 
not only negative images more than positive one, but strong emotions. These 
emotions have psychological repercussion on human behaviours. What I have 
been constructing so far is a representation of a space which operates at 
geographical and emotional level, and which frame our perception of the reality 
making prevailing the emotional aspects. A fastened space, a “geopolitical 
imagination” I would like to say, which likes the “Mancha” of Don Quijote and 
Sancho Panza has been reinterptretaded and opened through out the intellectual 
contributions of Critical Geopolitics14. 
This space is what Cassirer (mentioned above) calls the “symbolic 
space”: for his capacity to create signs and symbols which help him to interact 
with reality, the human being, then not more a positivist rational animal, 
becomes an animal symbolicum, and like such lives in a symbolic space, and 
this is a space which frames even his capacity of imagination. 
                                                          
11
  E. Cassirer, An Essay on Man, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1974 [1944]. 
12
  K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading MA, Addison-Wesley, 1979. 
13
  C. Weber, International Relations Theory – A Critical Introduction, London, Routledge, 2005. 
14
  G. O’Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, London, Routledge, 1996; G. O’Tuathail and S. Dalby (eds.), 
Rethinking Geopolitics, London, Routledge, 1998.  
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Then security becomes an emotional space in which organisms learn to 
fear and in which fear is associated to particular stimuli: in the case of OSS, the 
utterance and use of the word “security” constructs the world of security... 
military threat, chaos, anarchy, etc. 
Due to the fact those images have emotional repercussions to the 
individuals I would like to match the above correlation to a psychologically 
process defined as classical conditioning15 and conditioned reflex, more simply 
known by the example of Pavlov’s dog. 
The classic experience of Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936) is that of the dog, the 
bell, and the salivation to the view of a piece of meat. Whenever we present to 
the dog a piece of meat, seeing and sniffing it and makes the animal salivate. If 
we ring a bell, what is the effect on the animal? An orienting reaction. It simply 
looks around and turns its head to look for where that sound stimulus comes 
from. If we repeatedly ring the bell, and immediately after show the meat and 
give it to the dog, after a certain number of times, simply ringing the bell 
provokes salivation in the animal, preparing its digestive system to receive the 
meat. The bell becomes a sign of the meat that will come later. The whole body 
of the animal reacts as if the meat was already present, with salivation, digestive 
secretions, digestive motricity, etc. A stimulus that has nothing to do with 
feeding, a mere sound, becomes then capable to induce digestive modifications.  
 
 
                                                          
15
  Classical Conditioning is a form of associative learning that was first demonstrated by 
Ivan Pavlov. The original and most famous example of classical conditioning involved the 
salivary conditioning of Pavlov's dogs. During his research on the physiology of digestion in 
dogs, Pavlov noticed that, rather than simply salivating in the presence of meat powder (an innate 
response to food that he called the unconditioned response), the dogs began to salivate in the 
presence of the lab technician who normally fed them. Pavlov called these psychic secretions. 
From this observation he predicted that, if a particular stimulus in the dog’s surroundings were 
present when the dog was presented with meat powder, then this stimulus would become 
associated with food and cause salivation on its own. In his initial experiment, Pavlov used bells 
to call the dogs to their food and, after a few repetitions, the dogs started to salivate in response to 
the bell. Thus, a neutral stimulus (metronome) became a conditioned stimulus (CS) as a result of 
consistent pairing with the unconditioned stimulus (US - meat powder in this example). Pavlov 
referred to this learned relationship as a conditional reflex (now called Conditioned Response).  
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We can then assume that any time the alarm bell of security is ringed, 
stressful physical and emotional human reactions are lived. 
Still now in Paris, every day at high noon, the old Second World War air 
raid sirens are howling: a message which remember us how the local population 
at that time was living in fear of attacks, destruction and death. 
Clearly “our emotions have a mind in their own, one which can hold 
views quite independently of our rational mind. (…) Those unconscious 
opinions are emotional memories; their storehouse is the amygdala.”16  
In humans the amygdale is an almond shaped cluster of interconnected 
structure perched above the brainstem, near the bottom of the limbic ring. There 
are two amygdalas, one for each side of the brain, nestled toward the side of the 
head17. “The amygdale is the specialist for emotional matters. If the amygdale is 
severed from the rest of the brain, the result is a striking inability to gauge the 
emotional significance of events (…) and more than affection is tied to the 
amygdale; all passion depends on it.”18 In dangerous or threatening situation 
“the emergency route from eye or ear to thalamus to amygdale is crucial: it 
saves time in an emergency, when an instantaneous response is required. But 
this circuit from thalamus to amygdale carries only a small portion of sensory 
messages, with the majority taking the main route up to the neocortex. So what 
registers in the amygdale via this express route is, at best, a rough signal, just 
enough for a warning. As LeDoux points out, ‘You don’t need to know exactly 
what something is to know that it may be dangerous.’”19 The OSS in my opinion 
                                                          
16
  Daniel Goleman (1996), “Emotional Intelligence”. 
17
  The amygdalae (Latin, also corpus amygdaloideum, singular amygdala, from Greek 
αµυγδαλή, amygdalē, 'almond', 'tonsil', listed in the Grey's Anatomy as the nucleus amygdalæ) are 
almond-shaped groups of nuclei located deep within the medial temporal lobes of the brain in 
complex vertebrates, including humans. Shown in research to perform a primary role in the 
processing and memory of emotional reactions, the amygdalae are considered part of the limbic 
system. In complex vertebrates, including humans, the amygdalae perform primary roles in the 
formation and storage of memories associated with emotional events. Research indicates that, 
during fear conditioning, sensory stimuli reach the basolateral complexes of the amygdalae, 
particularly the lateral nuclei, where they form associations with memories of the stimuli. The 
association between stimuli and the aversive events they predict may be mediated by long-term 
potentiation, a lingering potential for affected synapses to react more readily. Memories of 
emotional experiences imprinted in reactions of synapses in the lateral nuclei elicit fear behavior 
through connections with the central nucleus of the amygdalae. The central nuclei are involved in 
the genesis of many fear responses, including freezing (immobility), tachycardia (rapid heartbeat), 
increased respiration, and stress-hormone release. Damage to the amygdalae impairs both the 
acquisition and expression of Pavlovian fear conditioning, a form of classical conditioning of 
emotional responses. The amygdalae are also involved in appetitive (positive) conditioning. It 
seems that distinct neurons respond to positive and negative stimuli, but there is no clustering of 
these distinct neurons into clear anatomical nuclei. Different nuclei within the amygdala have 
different functions in appetitive conditioning. 
18
  Daniel Goleman (1996), Emotional Intelligence. 
19
  Ibid.  
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has pretended to work in this way, and this is a view I reject in this paper 
because of its repercussion on the intelligence activity.  
Inside the NATO countries, any time the security bell was ringed (the 
rough signal) the people’s amygdales were alarmed and everybody was starting 
to look for the “communist devil” wearing the soviet combat uniform. A show 
of paranoia in which even if the “communist devil” was not there, the simple 
suspicious made his presence real. We all know how manipulative, and 
oppressive, has been in both theatres the hunting for the ideological enemy in 
order to construct homogeneous cultural scripts.  
And this because, as Buzan highlights, “The difference between normal 
challenges and threats to national security necessarily occurs on a spectrum of 
threats that ranges from trivial and routine, through serious but routine, to 
drastic and unprecedented. (…) The labelling of an issue as a security problem 
by the government automatically legitimizes the use of exceptional means.”20 
This “labelling process” which I see as a “certification process” is very 
well represented by the fact that either George Smiley’s world (and the majority 
of the spy literature and movies at the time) as the OSS were pointing and 
moving into the same Vertebrate-Solid “Geopolitical-Narrative Framework”21 
as a Security’s Interpretative Dimension. 
However the implosion of the Soviet Union, and the disappearance of the 
“iron curtain” brought to an end not only the Cold War but, and with it, the 
conditioned reflex….the looking for, or the imagining (like Don Quijote) the 
threatening big enemy, and as a consequence our George Smiley did not know 
on what to spy. 
Now for whom the bell tolls? If someone was still continuing to ring the 
bell in order to alarm people with old memories of red phantoms, well…the 
show was over and the bell was only tolling for the death of the Orthodox 
Security approach, the end of ideologies, and as someone wrote, for the end of 
history. A bell was tolling for a war never fought, a victory never achieved, an 
enemy never defeated, and a standing army of soldiers and spies without a 
mission. But the causes of the OSS-Intelligence crises were not only the 
implosion of the Soviet Union, other reasons were linked to technological 
innovation, the use of new media and means of transport and communication, 
                                                          
20
  Barry Buzan (1991), “People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security 
Studies in the Post-Cold War Era”. 
21
  “A ‘geopolitical-narrative-framework’ is a physical and intellectual-symbolic space (as a 
hermeneutical circle), in which emotions and perceptions are elaborated through a narrative 
(narrative is a re-presentation of real or invented events), in order to produce a particular image 
and meaning to be attached to the word “security”. It is a space in which the reader, “volente o 
nolente”, willy-nilly, is part of it and where he is called to play an active emotional/interpretative 
role. As a result, the emotional state of the reader depends on the opinion-narrative of others.” 
Giovanni Ercolani, “Keeping Security and Peace: Behind the Strategicalization of NATO’s ‘Critical 
Security Discourse’”, The Journal of Security Strategies, Year: 7, Issue: 14, December 2011, p. 54. 
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and the more mobility of people around the world. Undoubtedly society and the 
world were changing, and the rigid frame was grumbling down: unfortunately the 
OSS-Intelligence community remained prisoner into the same Vertebrate-Solid 
“Geopolitical-Narrative Framework” which they produced and from which they survived. 
 
 
2.b. Security and Liquidity 
 
As the Cold War helped the construction of opposed marks of identity 
developed by the two opposite factions, the end of the Cold War has provoked 
the slow disappearance of net, clear, identifiable, identi-cal22 characters. Now 
we have passed “from the ‘solid’ to the ‘fluid’ phase of modernity; and fluids’ 
are so called because they cannot keep their shape for long, and unless they are 
poured into a tight container they keep changing shape under the influence of 
even the slightest of forces. In a fluid setting, there is no knowing whether to 
expect a flood or a drought – it is better to be ready for both eventualities. Frames, 
when (if) they are available, should not be expected to last for long. They will 
not be able to withstand all the leaking, seeping, trickling, spilling – sooner 
rather than later they will drench, soften, contort and decompose.”23 
In order to continue our intellectual journey which started in the time of 
orthodox security and will end in the 2010, in which I call now, the time of 
liquid security, I need to reassert some historical moments. 
With the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, the western organisation 
which motivated its existence in the name of an external enemy attack started to 
suffer of identity problem. Until that moment for NATO countries, the 
identification of the threat and the enemy have been always clear, not to 
mention the territory of the supposed battlefield. Even the “security intellectual” 
field was dedicated to speculations on countries belonging to one side or the 
other of the iron curtain. In our case, the centre was represented by the national 
security of the NATO members, and being a centre, there was a geographical 
periphery, which was not on the security agenda, because…not the centre. 
The conflicts which erupted in the periphery, if they were not regarded 
and certified of “strategic importance” on the big chess game between the two 
superpowers, they were left there, in this periphery of not importance. The 
situation was overturned completely after 1991. If until that moment it was 
possible to live in peace, well protected, and isolated in our fortresses, the new 
conflicts which exploded around us become a security concern for us too (We-
NATO): the centre became the periphery and the periphery the centre. Without 
entering into the details (because the literature on these topics is very extensive) 
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after 1991 we saw not only the explosion of unforeseeable conflicts but these 
conflicts were in their shape completely new and at the beginning irrelevant for 
NATO. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq were not 
considered by the strategists of NATO as possible theatres of any intelligence 
activity, military involvement and operations. NATO was structured to win a 
war in the classical sense, not to provide and project security behind its vallum. 
It was not just the context which changed, but the nature and the paradigm 
attached to the concept of security. 
It this with the involvement in these conflicts that NATO, obsessed in 
staying alive after the vanishing of its mortal enemy, had to re-invent itself. In 
contrast, to redefining its mission it had to reframe (and re-bureaucratize in 
Weberian sense) the concept of security no longer monopolized by a military 
syntax. Apparently they realized that the simple equation “a security problem is 
a military problem to be solved through military means” was not valid any more 
and that in it we needed to add more variables. However NATO was organised 
to fight a war, but the new conflicts in which [it] decided to operate, had new 
shapes so much different from the ones its military manoeuvres were staged. At 
this point I would like to insert in my analysis a specific clarification due to the 
fact that we are dealing with terms which have origin in Latin as security-
securitas. Referring to the etymologic meaning of ‘war’ we can trace back its 
origin in the Indo-European root ‘wers’, to confuse, mix up.” For the Romans, 
bellum was what we translate nowadays as war.  
War-Warre-Guerra entered into Medieval Latin because of the Germanic 
invasion inside the Roman Empire. Then “Guerra” refers to a conflict 
characterised by confusion, disorder, strife, the confusion of all against all, and 
not the dispute, the duel, the formalised confrontation, that lays the 
etymological meaning in the Latin bellum. 
Then I can argue that we can have two type of war:  
• “bellum-war”, the dispute, the duellum;  
• “wers-war” identify by disorder, and confusion. 
Therefore NATO (and the OSS approach which finds in NATO its armed 
hand), had been geared to fight “bellum-war”, and not “wers-war”. Despite the 
above NATO has had now to confront itself with “wers-war”.  
The conflicts which come to stage after the implosion of the Soviet Union 
have been variously characterized as:  
• “new war”24, in which, opposite to what Mary Kaldor defines as “old war” 
(war between states in which the aim is to inflict maximum violence, then 
are becoming an anachronism) we are in front of a new type of organized 
violence which could be described as a mixture of war, organized crime 
and massive violations of human rights. According to Kaldor actors are 
                                                          
24
  Mary Kaldor (2006), “New & Old War”, Cambridge: Polity. 
FROM GEORGE SMILEY TO QUANTUM OR ON FICTION, REALITY AND CREATIVITY AROUND SECURITY 47 
both global and local, public and private. These new wars are fought for 
particularistic political goals using tactics of terror and destabilization that 
are theoretically outlawed by the rules of modern warfare.  
• “War amongst people”: “it is the reality in which the people in the 
street and houses and fields – all the people, anywhere – are the 
battlefield. Military engagements can take place anywhere: in the 
presence of civilians, against civilian, in defence of civilians. Civilians 
are the targets, objectives to be won, as much an opposing forces.” In 
contrast to what Gen. Rupert Smith defines as “interstate industrial 
war”, the new paradigm of war amongst people is based on the concept 
of a continuous criss-crossing between confrontation and conflict, 
regardless of whether a state is facing another state or a non-state 
actor. Rather than war and peace, there is not predefined sequence, nor 
is peace necessarily either the starting or the end point: conflicts are 
resolved, but not necessarily confrontations.”25 And personally I see 
here that violence will have much more in common with “the cudgel of 
people's war” (“That without consulting anyone's tastes or rules, and 
regardless of anything else, it rose and fell with stupid simplicity, but 
consistently”)26 than the Clausewitz’s duel. There is more about war in 
Tolstoy’s “Peace and War” and in the words of the General Kutuzov 
than in “On the War” of Clausewitz. 
• “Large group identity-conflict”, in which a threat against a large group 
identity brings a psychological regression that can spark an identity 
conflict. Here “the concept of large-group identity describes how 
thousands or millions of individuals, most of whom will never meet in 
their life-times, are bound by an intense sense of sameness by belonging 
to the same ethnic, religious, national, or ideological group. (…) When 
large groups are threatened by conflict, members of the group cling 
evermore stubbornly to these circumstances in an effort to maintain and 
regulate their sense of self and their sense of belonging to a large-
group. At such times, large-groups process become dominant and 
large-group identity issue and rituals are more susceptible to political 
propaganda and manipulation. Political, economic, legal, military, and 
historical factors usually figure prominently in any attempt to manage 
and solve large-group conflicts, but it is also necessary to consider the 
profound effect of human psychology, especially specific large-group 
processes that evolve under stress or after massive trauma and are 
manipulated by leaders.”27. 
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• Hybrid conflicts: “Although conventional in form, the decisive battles 
in today's hybrid wars are fought not on conventional battlegrounds, 
but on asymmetric battlegrounds within the conflict zone population, 
the home front population, and the international community population. 
Irregular, asymmetric battles fought within these populations ultimately 
determine success or failure. Hybrid war appears new in that it 
requires simultaneous rather than sequential success in these diverse 
but related ‘population battlegrounds.’ (…)Thus, hybrid wars are a 
combination of symmetric and asymmetric war in which intervening 
forces conduct traditional military operations against enemy military 
forces and targets while they must simultaneously--and more decisively-
-attempt to achieve control of the combat zone's indigenous populations 
by securing and stabilizing them (stability operations). Hybrid conflicts 
therefore are full spectrum wars with both physical and conceptual 
dimensions: the former. a struggle against an armed enemy and the 
latter, a wider struggle for, control and support of the combat zone's 
indigenous population, the support of the home fronts of the intervening 
nations, and the support of the international community. In hybrid war, 
achieving strategic objectives requires success in all of these diverse 
conventional and asymmetric battlegrounds. At all levels in a hybrid 
war's country of conflict, security establishments, government offices 
and operations, military sites and forces, essential services, and the 
economy will likely be either destroyed, damaged, or otherwise 
disrupted. To secure and stabilize the indigenous population, the 
intervening forces must immediately rebuild or restore security, 
essential services, local government, self-defense forces and essential 
elements of the economy. Historically, hybrid wars have been won or 
lost within these areas. They are battlegrounds for legitimacy and 
support in the eyes of the people.”28  
But still, new-war, war amongst people, large group identity-conflict, and 
hybrid conflict, all of them retain this ambivalence of “wers-war” in which we have 
been forced to look at them, and where the primacy is still given to the word “war”. 
CSS and the recent contributions from Contemporary Conflict Resolution 
studies suggest us that the above conflicts, and if we identify them on a map we 
can picture in front of us, no one of them was concluded with a peace 
agreement. What CSS also does is to insist on the critical epistemology, the 
critical research practice, which, as Booth (cited above) argued, offers an 
emancipatory approach into this difficult material. 
We have to start to see at these and future conflicts through the lens of 
peace, then not win war (“bellum-war”, and or “wers-war”) but the priority is to 
win security. Then a new position from which see the conflict and win it. In a 
very cynical way mythology already presented the case to win a war in using 
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the narrative of peace. The Trojan horse had a peaceful meaning for the Trojans, 
because it was the emblem of their city, but not for the Greek. Presented as a 
gift for peace the natural reaction of the Trojans was to open the door of their 
city. And I ask, was it another rough signal? We know the events that followed. 
Ulysses was condemned by the God Poseidon (the God of the Sea, Earthquakes 
and Horses) to wander ten years before returning to his home land. And his 
return was helped by the Goddess Athena, the Goddess of strategic warfare, 
wisdom, and heroic endeavour.  
Then the cunning of Ulysses (his way to be liquid in his warfare approach 
and to understand the enemy local culture-symbolism) and not the muscle of the 
semi-god Achilles brought to an end a long war (10 years of “certified” military 
strategies and I say Orthodox Security) and victory to the Greeks. 
 
 
3. The Need of a Paradigm Shift: from the Achilles’ to the Ulysses’ Paradigm 
 
An epistemological paradigm shift was called a scientific revolution by 
epistemologist and historian of science Thomas Kuhn in his book “The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions” (1962). A scientific revolution occurs, 
according to Kuhn, when scientists encounter anomalies which cannot be 
explained by the universally accepted paradigm within which scientific progress 
has thereto been made. The paradigm, in Kuhn's view, is not simply the current 
theory, but the entire worldview in which it exists, and all of the implications 
which come with it. It is based on features of landscape of knowledge that 
scientists can identify around them.  
The necessity to move from an Achilles’ paradigm which was focused on 
the wall, on the nuclear weapons, and not on what the local society (the enemy) 
was living inside their own culture, is strongly supported by the recent 
innovations inside NATO community on what is considered security. 
If we follow the evolutions of the NATO discourse up to the adoption of 
the recent NATO New Strategic Concept (Lisbon, 10th Nov 2010) we can see 
how the military organisation has understood the need of a “paradigm shift”, 
then a new paradigm, a liquid one, which not only will help to adapt its 
organization to the new threats, but will contribute on how to perceive and 
certified them, and consequently to address its intelligence community. 
The new NATO’s paradigm was provided by the “NATO emerging security 
challenges” as reported on the speech of the NATO Secretary General Rasmussen 
on emerging risks (London, Oct 1, 2009). “The challenges we are looking at 
today cut across the divide between the public and the private sectors”29 the 
NATO Secretary General said. Furthermore, his speech embraced the following 
pretexts for NATO interventions which his own words this future “casus belli” 
include: a.) piracy; b.) cyber security / defence; c.) climate change; d.) extreme 
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weather events – catastrophic storms and flooding; e.) the rise of sea levels; 
f.) population movement …populations will move in large numbers…always 
where someone else lives, and sometimes across borders; g.) water shortages; 
h.) droughts; i.) a reduction in food production; î.) the retreating of the Arctic 
ice for resources that had, until now, been covered under ice; j.) global warming; 
k.) CO2 emissions; l.) reinforcing factories or energy stations or transmission 
lines or ports that might be at risk of storms or flooding; m.) energy, where 
diversity of supply is a security issue; n.) natural and humanitarian disasters; 
o.) big storms, or floods, or sudden movements of populations; p.) and fuel 
efficiency, thus reducing our overall dependence on foreign sources of fuel.  
As Rick Rozoff pointed out in a 2009 article, “none of the seventeen 
developments mentioned can even remotely be construed as a military threat 
and certainly not one posed by recognized state actors”30.  
On the other hand, the NATO map was provided by Lieutenant General 
Jim Soligan, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff, of the NATO Allied Command 
Transformation on Apr 17, 2009, at “The Second International Symposium on 
Strategic and Security Studies”, organized in Istanbul by the University of 
Beykent, one of Istanbul’s many universities31.  
In his presentation, the NATO General showed a map of potential areas 
of intervention for NATO and defined potential regions of crisis as “Multiple 
Stress Zones”, adding that “Instability is likely to be greatest in areas of 
Multiple Environmental Stress”. 
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According to General, the impact of these Emerging Security Challenges on 
NATO will produce security and military implications. The Security Implications 
are: a.) rethinking Article 5; b.) enhancing and creating new partnerships; 
c.) expanded opportunities to positively shape and influence ideas, values, and 
events and d.) changes in military operations: e.) technological vulnerabilities. 
While as Military Implications, NATO will have to:  
• adapt to the demands of hybrid ; 
• adapt force structures, doctrine to train other nation’s security forces; 
• adapt C2 and organizational structures; 
• enhance WMD detection and Consequence Management; 
• strengthen EU/NATO/UN relationships, and 
• win the Battle of the Narrative.  
If we overlap General Soligan’s presentation with the speech of the 
NATO Secretary General, we will see that not only the main points regarding 
the possible security challenges are the same but, at geopolitical level, the 
threats – Multiple Stress Zone – are all outside the territories of NATO countries.  
If, until the implosion of the Soviet Union, the terminology of the balance 
of power, nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union, and the communist enemy was 
framed in a “defence” vernacular, now – with the disappearance of a concrete, 
identifiable and definable enemy – the foe becomes a situation (Multiple Stress 
Zone) in which the particular interests of NATO countries are at risk. 
Consequently if we look at the above map we can understand the strong 
necessity to move from what I call the Achilles’ paradigm to the Ulysses’ one in 
which a new way to make intelligence is a vital imperative: all the area of 
possible operations are outside the cultural-symbolic territory of the NATO countries. 
However the above security discourse not only doesn’t mention any 
particular stereotype of enemy but pay a particular attention to new actors as 
“liquid-cellular-fluid enemies”. 
4. “Liquid-Cellular-Fluid Enemy” and SpECTRE 
 
If we follow the archaeology of the NATO new security paradigm discourse 
(how it moved from a defence-Achilles’ paradigm to a Security-Ulysses’ one) 
we can really understand the challenges we will face and how the need to 
reform the intelligence community is a vital priority for our security.  
The first official change happened with the approval of the NATO New 
Strategic Concept (signed April 24th 1999) in which two specific articles 
mention the possibility to have the NATO countries’ interests jeopardized by 
“critical-security threats”32 and then to start glimpsing on what was going on 
outside the NATO wall.  
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With this 1999 NATO Strategic Concept, the Alliance started developing 
a role in collective security33 and Articles 20 and 24 are very clear examples of 
linking threat-instability-interests:  
• Art. 20: “Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate 
or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the 
dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability”; 
• Art. 24: “Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a 
wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime 
and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources”.34 
In 2006, at the Riga NATO summit, entitled “Transforming NATO in a 
New Global Era”35, three important moments stood apart. The first was the 
declaration made by the former American President George Bush Jr. according 
to whom “NATO is in transition from a static force to an expeditionary force”, 
then in line with Rasmussen’s more recent speeches. The other two moments 
were embodied by two specific initiatives which confirmed the inseparable link 
between energy security, global war on terror and a new NATO geopolitical map. 
The first was made by the American Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which comparing energy to a weapon 
suggested the possibility for NATO countries to invoke art. 5 in the case their 
energy supplies were cut off by force36. The other, promoted by Jamie Shea, 
Director of Policy Planning, saw the possibility for the creation of a NATO 
Energy Security and Intelligence Analysis Cell responsible for the gathering of 
information on terrorism and energy security from various sources37.  
Another important moment was represented by the 2008 Bucharest NATO 
Summit in which the American initiative to let Georgia join the Alliance was rejected 
by various NATO members. I cannot see the importance of Georgia in NATO 
without thinking about the strategic and economic importance of the various pipelines 
which, crossing the territory of Georgia, carry energy resources from Central Asia. 
Despite American pressure on this initiative other Alliance countries understood that 
in case of troubles in Georgia (as was the case in Aug 2008) resolution was not 
through military means, something which in reality happened.  
The last historical moment in the construction of this narrative is represented 
by the recent NATO Strategic Concept approved in Lisbon on Nov 10th, 2010 (NNSC 
2010). Accordingly, the defence and security of the Members of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation “will be based on an Active Engagement, Modern Defence”: 
“4. The modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set 
of challenges to the security of NATO’s territory and populations. In order to 
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assure their security, the Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively 
three essential core tasks, all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance 
members, and always in accordance with international law:  
• Collective defence. NATO members will always assist each other against attack, 
in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment 
remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of 
aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the 
fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.  
• Crisis management38. NATO has a unique and robust set of political and 
military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, 
during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate 
mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing 
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crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they 
escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect 
Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict 
situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security. 
• Cooperative security. The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political 
and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage 
actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant 
countries and other international organisations; by contributing actively to 
arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door 
to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet 
NATO’s standards.”39 
Therefore overlapping the NATO narrative and the Gen. Soligan map we 
see how the importance to know the human terrain, the “other” culture, in short 
to have that capacity of the Ulysses’ gaze, to translate foreign symbols in 
tactical tools for his own strategy and security, become valid capabilities. 
However we have to go back to the fiction world of spy story and see 
how this world in a way was more able to perceive what was going on in the 
real world despite the “scientific” evidences provided by the academic and 
George Smiley-Achilles’ paradigm. 
This is a necessity because the intelligence activity conducted in a “liquid 
paradigm” must be ready to interpret various messages coming from different sources. 
If during the Cold War period the intelligence services of the NATO 
countries were not able to understand the capability, intention, and reality of our 
mortal enemy, there is the danger that we can reproduce the same situation right 
now on focusing too much on stereotype image of our enemy or potential 
enemies and then to remain fossilized on the Achilles’ paradigm. There is but an 
intuition which comes from the world of fiction literature, and more precisely 
from a former member of the English Secret Service, and which links the period 
of the Cold War to 2008. If we had to drawn a line between the year 1961 
(SpECTRE's first and last appearance as a worldwide power is in the novel 
“Thunderball”40 published in 1961), and the year 2008 (the last James Bond 
movie “Quantum of Solace” was released in the 2008) we can see a constant in 
the message of James Bond/Ian Fleming. 
Ian Fleming, a member himself of the British Naval Intelligence Division 
during the Second World War, was very aware, thanks to his various 
professional experiences (and his acquaintance with people of different levels 
and occupations), of the existence of real menaces well beyond the stereotyping 
“enemies” depicted during the Cold War. SpECTRE (Special Executive for 
Counter-intelligence, Terrorism, Revenge and Extortion) came to existence in 
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the 1961, the same year of the Cuban Missile Crisis, then in a moment of strong 
tension between the major players in the Cold War confrontation, but Fleming 
was not afraid of the Soviet/Communist threat. SpECTRE is a global criminal 
organization, organized as a “multinational”, where the terrorist activity is only 
one among its diversified strategic criminal activities aimed to conquer the 
world. SpECTRE, has is office in 136 bis Boulevard Haussmann, Paris, and use 
as a cover, an international organization (or NGO), which main mission is to 
help “oppressed people”: FIRCO (Fraternité Internationale de la Résistance 
Contre l'Oppression). Of course here we are talking about fictional characters, but 
the resemblance to the activities of recent terrorist-criminal organisations is stunning. 
Not to talk about the other organisation Quantum created by the mind of 
the script player of the more recent James Bond movies (Casino Royale, 2006; 
Quantum of Solace, 2008). But while the goals of SpECTRE were revealed, 
Quantum has more nebulous shape and motives. Here again we are confronted 
with a “multinational” criminal organisation in which one of the leaders maneuvers 
his company, Greene Planet (again a NGO, which interest are focused on 
environmental problems; we are in 2008), to take control of Bolivia's water 
supply, which might be part of a larger terrorist plot. Let’s overlap the James 
Bond visual messages and we come up with the “liquid, invertebrate, molecular, 
and impalpable” structure of criminal organization that during the time (1961-2008), 
and without being involved in political ideologies or religious credo, or linked 
to any state in particular, has been able to operate and make profits from legal 
high finance investment, energy resources, money laundry, drug, prostitution, 
and may be even outsourcing terrorist activities in order to spread fear and take 
advantages from it. Can we move aside this popular literature in defining it pure 
fiction (Oscar Wilde should have use “dry goods”), or here we have elements 
which can be used for further and different use? 
At the end of the Second World War the threat of ethno-nationalist-
political-religious terrorist organizations started to spread around and with it the 
phenomenon of organized crime. But the structure of these organizations were 
copies of the vertebrate, bureaucratic structures present in the State apparatus, 
the typical pyramidal, hierarchical configuration of the Army, the Police, 
Intelligence agencies, the Ministry, etc. Now days the dimension of this union 
of forces between criminal-terrorist enterprises doesn’t overlap with the static 
structure of their enemy, the State, but, on the contrary, it is exactly the copy 
(cellular-fluid) of the various multinational, franchising, investment companies 
that have made the financial world their battle fields. 
It is on the liquidity of this form of threat that we have to focus our 
attention, but until we will persist in the same paradigm in perceiving the threat 
itself and our protocol of response to it, in a rigid-military way, we will be 
condemned to repeat the same mistakes. This liquid threat is more vicious 
because, as said before, doesn’t refer to any particular ideology or religion, but 
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to a human weakness: “quantum” is a Latin world, and in English can be 
translates in “How much”? Definitely this world financial crisis, that is not a 
crisis at all but a new dangerous reality will produce a lot of potential labour 
force for the above Quantum organisations.  
If we want to use again the word “conflict” I call the combination of 
threat/response as a “liquid conflict”. 
In “liquid conflict” there are more than two dimensions, and the field is 
open, not framed by borders or treaties, and the conflicting parties are liquid 
too: “the new wars are ‘globalized’ wars”41. The threatening entity can be a 
combination of all the forms the conflict-actors-motivation can assume and that 
I presented above. The contrasting side, the “securitizer” should be liquid too 
because must enter in this conflict not in a rigid form but will have to adapt 
itself to the “local terrain”, taking in consideration that with the passage of time, 
and the mutation of situations, its attitude toward the participation into the 
conflict becomes a liquid too. We live in complex and open societies were 
different sentiments, affiliations, and loyalties coexist, and where is quite 
difficult to establish the contours of real and “imagined communities”42 which 
are present in a “securitizer” state. Therefore people living into the frame of the 
same state can be interpellated, and be loyal to different communities which can 
not be the state itself where they reside, mining then even the basic concept of 
state and its social contract. 
The idea of “liquid conflict” call in a major collaboration between various 
sectors of our society, and members of our society which is always moving and 
changing. This new form of conflict presuppose that we have to leave the door 
open to various analysis and interpretations of the human nature, and much 
more when we deal with insecure wannabe situations. Who could have possibly 
imagined the sparking historical situations which brought to the First World 
War, the Second one, and the Global War on Terrorism? History is not linear, 
and if there on this planet an animal which is the most dangerous, definitely this 
is the human being. 
The necessity to go back to “securitas” means not only an epistemological 
position but a return to the intrinsic message encapsulated in the Latin word 
securitas, in which the human, as a superior entity, return in possession of his 
dignity. The critic position is the position of a judge, and “critic” has its origin 
                                                          
41
  “The new wars are ‘globalized’ wars. They involve the fragmentation and decentralization 
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  Benedict Anderson, (2006 [1983]), Imagined Communities, London: Verso. 
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in the Greek kritikos: judge, and as any good judge, before taking a responsible 
decision, he want to listen more versions, and from more people about the 
events, and this is sometime the position of the Political Scientist.  
CSS help us to understand the relativism of our positions, of our 
“framed-certified” perceptions, and it presents itself as a “reforming” voice, in which 
scepticism can become a key to open the door of this space in which we have 
been enclosed like in the Plato’s cave, or in the hallucinated world of Don Quijote. 
For the above reasons, and with the purpose to secure our societies, and 
our existence, because we as human beings are all connected each other as 
liquids are, we have go back to basic philosophical, ontological questions: 
• What is reality? 
• What is real knowledge? 
• What we can do?  
Only after having answered the above questions we will be able to 
approach the topic of security from a different optic and then produce a liquid 
paradigm. A new paradigm born out not from the “certified” label, or the 
“rough signal”, or even the Pavlov’s bell, but from the fact that has decided to 
fix as a referent centre the etymological meaning of security as “securitas” 
(freedom from care; carelessness, safety, security). 
The original significance of security-securitas must be the orthodoxy, the 
doctrine, and more under the light of the global society. 
In fixing this unchangeable meaning, as a centre, and accepting that the 
referent object is not a tribe or the national interest of a particular tribe, but the 
human society, then all the answers to the following questions will provide us, 
any time they do not much with the centre, with a distance, which represent the 
manipulation, the “appearance”, the cacophony, in which every wannabe 
security discourse has been disguised. 
• What is being secured? 
• What is being secured against? 
• Who provide security? 
• What methods can be undertaken to provide it?  
It will be the gap between the securitas-centre and the various “security 
discourses”, which could be seen as a window. Bigger the distance between the 
too points, bigger the window, which will open our eyes and show us that in 
front of us we have real windmills and not frightening giants. 
But CSS at the same time provide us with very practical tools when we 
go back to the Buzan’s security sectors theory. 
The five sectors of security: military, political, economic, societal, and 
environmental, all of them they have to play as a security team. 
The five sectors can become liquid tools (a new intelligence paradigm) to 
face liquid threats but with the purpose not to win a “wers-war”, a “bellum-war” 
or all the other variants analysed above, but with the aim to win security, 
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because this liquid threats infiltrate societies (I am more afraid of the spectre of 
Quantum then the spectre of terrorism), and borders or walls do not stop them. 
But again the problem remain on the credibility of the message and of the 
impartiality of actors because as recent events in Georgia had show to the 
world, other actors are capable in picking up a script and play the pantomime. 
What a coincidence that after the collapse of the iron curtain which divided two 
orthodox theatres a new liquid curtain is again, but less perceptible, dividing 
stages. The difference? Now, in this globalised liquid society, the theatres are 
more than two, and while the play is quite the same, the script is an open text in 
which all the authors copy and cheat each others. The problem is that every one 
of them wants to play the Pavlov’s bell and have us to obey as dogs. 
 
 
Conclusion: a New Intelligence Community for a Complex World 
 
I want to go back again to the last moments of the Cold War. When the 
Berlin Wall fall down, and not Soviet tanks were there ready to invade Europe, I 
can say that the NATO defense paradigm upon which all our knowledge (supposed 
science) of the enemy-Soviet Union was constructed and hegemonically divulgated, 
and inculcated with the purpose to construct on us (We-NATO) a habitus (as 
developed by P. Bordieu in his “Language & Symbolic Power”), really represented 
a structured protocol-paradigm-grid of analysis and interpretation.  
How did NATO paradigm explain the Soviet Union implosion? And if it 
tried, something that did not happen at all, how this paradigm was constructed 
and based on which, it certificated as “science”? Because this “official certification” 
operated at the academic level too, where “no-official-certificated” voices where 
labeled as heretics. 
Interestingly in 2005 Prof. Edward A. Kolodziej in his “Security and 
International Relations” gave an answer: no one of the International Relations 
rival theories, such as realism, neorealism, liberal institutionalism, classical 
economic liberalism, and Marxism, were able alone to explain the facts that 
brought a “contra-revolution” and the implosion of the Soviet Union. 
Then our intellectual task is not only attached to the academic world, and 
more precise the one dealing with International Relations and Political Science, 
but it is a real problem of philosophy of science on which our knowledge was 
based and will be based. 
If the Cold War period was interpreted and reconstructed by the OSS in a 
mechanicist model were two entities were opposed to each other, now we have 
work on a paradigm which is open to a big number of variables, among which 
the most difficult to quantify (and to foresee its behavior) is what Tolstoy called 
the “spirit of the army. The unknown factor which multiplied by the mass gives 
the resulting force43”. 
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So if the NATO paradigm and the various IR theories apparently were, as 
they are still now, not able to explain the 1989 events, what about the “secret 
service experts”, the various James Bonds who apparently were brighter on the 
movies than into the reality? 
An answer can be provided by Joseph J. Trento and his book “The Secret 
History of the CIA”: during the cold-war at the USA embassy in Berlin no one 
was an expert on Russian language-culture. 
And what about the more recent years, let’s say the time before the 
terrorist attack of Sept 11, 2011? Well, “See No Evil: The True Story of a 
Ground Soldier in the CIA's War Against Terrorism”, the 2003 memoir by 
Robert Baer, a former CIA case officer in the Directorate of Operations, give us 
another dramatic answer: despite the fact that the world was changing and 
apparently not the official defense-security paradigm, as a result very few CIA 
operatives had high skills in Arabic language, not to talk about the total lack of 
Arabic and/or Muslim culture experts. 
Going back to Buzan’s security sectors theory, and using an 
anthropological approach I can say that the most important sector are the 
societal and the environmental ones. The societal one (identity, or according to 
Ulysses the culture-symbols of Troy and the Trojans), the X variable, the 
human factor (what Tolstoy calls the unknown “X” factor) because if there is 
not human society there are not the others sectors and if the environmental is 
not present, then we do not have the other sectors too, but society and 
environment influence each other. Consequently I can affirm that if we have to 
work on a new paradigm we have to start to concentrate by the time being on 
two pillars: societal and environment-al. 
Because of that the big challenge now is not only to face various liquid 
threats but to reform and produce a paradigm which will help us to reorganize 
an “intelligence” approach to new global realities. 
When we read the above NATO security discourses we have to remember 
that we-NATO are not the only human being living on this planet but other 
realities are present were various different relations are constructed between the 
societal and the environment-al:  
• Other countries like China (with a population of 1.5 billion) have 
produced their own concept of war. “Unrestricted Warfare” is a book on 
military strategy written in 1999 by two colonels in the People's 
Liberation Army, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. The book rather than 
focusing on direct military confrontation examines a variety of other 
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means which can be summarized in the Formula: Schwartzkopf + Soros 
+ Xiaomolisi + Bin Laden.44 
• At the G20 Seoul meeting (2010) even the map of the world financial 
crisis was changed. Despite the western countries depicted the financial 
crisis as a global one, its perception from other global actors and 
emerging economies was completely different. According to O'Neill 
(Goldman Sachs), policy makers in Asia were referring to the global 
credit crisis as the "North Atlantic Crisis"45 Thus, and for the first time, 
the “others” defined our military alliance as a financial system. 
• When we look at the “Multiple Stress Zone” map presented by the 
NATO General Soligan in 2009, how can we not see that is the exact 
copy of Pentagon Map which was produced in the year 2004 46  to 
highlight the grand strategy for the American foreign policy? 
Furthermore the Pentagon Map is much more than a simple 
cartographic representation of the planet, it is a division of the world 
countries between the Functioning Core, characterized by economic 
interdependence, and the Non-Integrated Gap, characterized by unstable 
leadership and absence from international trade. The Core can be sub-
divided into Old Core (North America, Western Europe, Japan, 
Australia) and New Core (China, India). The Non-Integrated Gap 
includes the Middle East, South Asia (except India), most of Africa, 
Southeast Asia, and northwest South America. Thus using a realist 
terminology the Functioning Core can represent the land of order while 
the Non-Integrated Gap the land of anarchy and disorder and also it can 
be seen as a tentative to ethnicalize the world47. And if what can happen 
in the Non-Integrated Gap can produce security concerns to the NATO 
countries (which are part of the Functioning Core) and justify a military 
intervention in their internal affairs then “fear is something that is 
actually missing in a situation of international anarchy, and because it is 
missing it must be invented and skilfully deployed.”48 
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• World Population Growth Rate: “By 2003, the combined population of 
Europe, the United States, and Canada accounted for just 17 percent of the 
global population. In 2050, this figure is expected to be just 12 percent. (…) 
Today, roughly nine out of ten children under the age of 15 live in developing 
countries. (…) Indeed, over 70 percent of the world’s population 
growth between now and 2050 will take place in 24 countries, all of 
which are classified by the World Bank as low income or lower-middle 
income, with an average per capita income under $ 3,855 in 2008.”49 
• Consumption factor. “The estimated one billion people who live in 
developed countries have a relative per capita consumption rate of 32. 
Most of the world’s other 5.5 billion people that constitute the 
developing world, with relative per capita consumption rates below 32, 
are mostly down toward 1.” 50 
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How will it be possible to “secure our future” (the estimated one billion 
people who live in developed countries coincidentally is the same number of 
NATO people, the “our”) and then maintain a consumption factor of 32 when 
the “others” will want to consume like us? “The World Bank has predicted that 
by 2030 the number of middle-class people in the developing world will be 
1.2 billion – a rise of 200 percent since 2005. This means that the developing 
world’s middle class alone will be larger that the total populations of Europe, Japan, 
and the United States combined. From now on, therefore, the main driver of global 
economic expansion will be the economic growth of newly-industrialized countries, 




• Life expectancy rate. Will the people living in the “multiple stress 
zone” (the non- integrated gap) accept their dramatic living conditions, 
and live less than the people living in other parts of the globe? Will they 
accept the status quo that has produced their misery or will they rebel? 
And the peace that NATO will impose on them will be a “positive 
peace” or a “negative peace” which will reproduce the same “structural 
violence” that provoked unrest and internal conflict, and not seeing 
instead the “civil war as a system”52? 
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To sum up, globally we are approaching what is called a “take-off point” 
in which it is necessary to recreate a community able to see at security issues 
through new lens, a community ready to accept a progressive approach in which 
not only elements which belong to the “security problem” are analysed but a 
community capable to understand the dynamics of these elements, and their 
repercussions in society, and in a global geopolitical context.  
If the major accusation made against the intelligence community after the 
terrorist attacks of Sept 11, 2001, was their “lack of imagination”, then we have 
to contribute to the training of a young community of researchers through a 
multidisciplinary approach to security concerns in which Open Sources Analysis 
enter in the Academic world and were the cunning Ulysses’ gaze is a must. 
 
